During commissioning of the medical gas system of a new hospital, fourteen connection defects were found; six of these were potentially lethal cross-connections. A major contaminant was also detected throughout the medical gas system.
INTRODUCTION
The Flinders Medical Centre (FMC) opened in April, 1976 and now has 300 beds in use. An additional 200 beds are to be added shortly and a further 200 beds will be added in the final phase.
All medical gases and vacuum are supplied from a central "energy plant". Delivery is by way of a pipeline grid ( Figure I ) which has the following elements: (a) Main pipes to hospital building; (b) Secondary main pipes to each wing of the building; (c) "Riser" pipes from the secondary main at eight metre intervals; (d) Distribution pipes running horizontally from the riser pipes to the outlets.
Isolation valves are placed at the following points: main pipes; the origins of the secondary main pipes; the origins of the distribution pipes.
Low pressure detectors are located at the sources of the gases and near the origins of the secondary main pipes. The alarms sound in the central energy plant if pressure falls to 85 % of working pressure. Readings of pressures at detector points are given every thirty minutes but continuous readings are available and used when an alarm operates.
Additional low pressure detectors are located in high gas usage areas (viz. operating theatres, anaesthetic induction rooms, recovery ward, Intensive Care Unit (ICU), nursery, labour and delivery wards, accident and emergency area). In addition to relaying information to the energy plant, these detectors will cause red warning lights to operate in the area of usage should the pressure falL As a safety factor, there are two warning lights for each gas and a green indicator light to show that the alarm system is operative.
The Standards Association of Australia (SAA) has produced a code (SAA, 1973) to minimise hazards arising from the use of Allaestht'sia aJlll /"Ien,\i)'t! Care, Vol. VI, No. 3, AUKust, 1978 medical gases and similar codes are issued by other bodies (Department of Health and Social Security, 1972; Canadian Standards Association, 1975) . These codes are not compulsory unless contracts and building specifications require adherence to these rules. At the time of letting contracts for the FMC, the current SAA code was CZ9 (as revised in 1963), which has since been updated but the building contract was not changed to enforce these new recommendations. Section 9 of SAA 1169 provides requirements of testing and acceptance of medical gas systems but these requirements were considered insufficient because of the previous reports of misadventure with bulk gas delivery systems (Sprague and Archer 1975 , Epstein et al. 1962 , Wylie 1975 . The necessity for safety precautions in installation of medical gas systems has subsequently been adequately reviewed by Feeley and Hedley-Whyte (1976) .
The Administration of FMC, after consultation with the Department of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, decided to accept the medical gas system only if tested according to the modification of the British recommendations; ~he tests requested are detailed later. All tests were to be witnessed by a team consisting of -1. Medical Officer (M.G.T., representing the hospital). 2. Mechanical Engineer (representing the Architect) . 3. Mechanical Engineer (representing the Contractor) . Furthermore, the Department of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care recommended that no equipment depending on medical gases for its operation should be used until the medical gas system and the equipment had b~en fully tested. It was also recommended that, where possible, back-up systems (e.g. bottled gases), low-pressure alarms and oxygen monitors be incorporated in that apparatus.
A testing programme for a medical gas system should not only guarantee that the correct gas issues from a wall outlet but also that the patient will receive the gas mixture prescribed.
Although codes for safe operation of apparatus have existed for some years (British Standards Institute, 1955; SAA, 1969) , there is a continual process of evolution towards the perfect system. In Australia some potentially dangerous equipment has been commercially available but simple design modifications have rendered it relatively safe (Dilworth 1973 , Hood 1972 
METHOD

Pipeline Grid
The following procedures were to be satisfactorily completed prior to acceptance by FMC of the medical gas and suction system: 
Gas Identity Test
A Hudson Oxygen Monitor, Model No. 5550, with a C2 fuel cell was used at all labelled wall outlets to check identity of the issuing gas ( Figure 2 ). The equipment was calibrated at 0% using 100% N~O, at 21 % using room air and at 100% using 100% oxygen. A simple adaptor was used to break self-sealing wall outlets for both pressure and identity tests. This adaptor consisted of a central component of a flexible pipe connector (Medishield PN Nos. ZP631 and OR3 A2) welded into a tube. To prevent damage to the oxygen fuel cell, the inlet diameter was reduced to 1 mm ( Figure 3 ) . Static pressure was measured with an Ashcroft Bourdon pressure gauge. and oxygen analyser (left) to enable rapid testing of self-sealing gas outlets. Note that the bore of the tube leading to the oxygen analyser has been reduced to I mm.
Impurity Test
Ultra-violet (UV) spectroscopy ant.! gas chromatography (GC) were used for purity testing of gases in the first phase of t~e hospital. Samples were obtained b~ p.assl!1g the issuing gas via a flow meter to a lIqUid mtrogen trap; a total of 300 litres of gas was sampled at each sampling point. The trap was exammed frequently for ice formation and unb~ocked as necessary. The condensate was allowed to melt and any residue was measured and identified by GC (Hewlett-Packart.! Model 583A) and UV spectroscopy (Gilford Model 250). For the GC separations a two metre Porapak P column was used at a temperature of 179°C with a nitrogen flow rate of 30 ml per minute. Peaks were monitored by a flame ionization detector. Since it would have been extremely time consuming to test every outlet, the method adopted was to select outlets ~o that a terminal point of each secondary. mam pipe was tested. Mass spectrometry usmg a Centronic 200 MGA mass spectrometer was substituted in subsequent phases of testing ( Figure 4 ). 
Flow Tests':'
Flow tests (including vacuum) were performed on each riser at the source of gas. Flows in large main pipes were measured by inserting an orifice plate (i.e., a partition with an aperture of known diameter in the middle); the pressure drop across the plate was converted into flow. Rotameter flow meters were used to test gas outlets. Vacuum pressure and flow rates were measured at each outlet using a suction test gauge (Medishield PN MMB 11 ) ( Figure 5 ).
Footnote
Authors' Note: Since this manuscript was. sul?mitted for publication. Australian Standard 2120 -1977. "Suction Systems for Medical use in Hospitals". has been. pubhshe,d. Th.ls embodies the main recommendations for suctIOn mentIOned In this paper. 
Apparatus Tests
The testing procedures for medical gas apparatus were-1. Biomedical Engineering Department to test operation of valves, gauges and flow regulators and to test for leaks.
Medical Electronics Department to test
safety and operation of electrical components. 3. Selected medical and nursing staff to perform operational tests using test-lungs and oxygen analysers. Anaesthetic machines were tested both with cylinder gases and piped gases. Particular attention was paid to delivered oxygen concentration at the patient outlet, using a range of oxygen/nitrous oxide concentrations from o to 100% and avoiding a single reading at 50% O2 since a total cross over of N~O/O~ would still give a correct reading at 50 % 02/N 2 0. All vaporizers were also calibrated Anaesthesia (md Intensive Care, Vol. VI. No. 3, August, 1978 through the complete range of concentrations using a continuous reading mass spectrometer (Ilsley and Cousins 1978) .
RESULTS
Cross-Connections
A check for cross-connections was performed on all 1,225 outlets in Phase 1 of the project. A total of fourteen defects was found as listed in Table 1 . The most frequent defect was interchange of oxygen and air; also in four instances there was no vacuum at the suction outlet. An examination of pipes from one panel where two gases issued simultaneously from an outlet showed that two of the pipes were brazed together at a join in the air pipe. Apparently excessive heat in the brazing had melted a hole in the contiguous nitrous oxide and air pipes and this allowed an interchanging of gases ( Figure 6 ). Three of the interchanged pipelines occurred in a high dependency area. Initially vhese outlets were correct but the wrong outlet panels (one oxygen instead of two oxygen outlets) had been installed. The errors, which affected three of the four replaced panels, were detected during the repeat cross-connection check and the correct panels were then substituted.
Vacuum Errors
Blocked vacuum pipes in four panels were found to be due to the Contractor deliberately obstructing the riser pipes in order to test suction on one floor whilst work was being performed elsewhere. The obstruction had not been removed when it was no longer required.
Other Errors
One leaking pipe was found to be due to a 3 mm hole that had been drilled through the duct around the medical gas system. A selftapping screw securing the duct had been screwed through the pipe. At the time the hole was drilled, the gas system was not pressurised. This means of attaching electrical fittings was found in another twenty sites and an alternative method insisted upon before the work was allowed to continue. The twenty ducts concerned were dismantled and the contained pipes inspected; no damage was found. In addition there were instances of inadequate labelling, i.e. not according to the Australian Standard (SAA 1973 (SAA , 1972 and in two places, adhesive "Medical Nitrous Oxide" labels had been used to hold hand-written labels identifying the gas lines. In both cases, nitrous oxide pipes were not in the vicinity.
When all the above defects had been corrected the system was purged with the specific gas for each pipeline and final tests (viz. identity of gas, purity of gas and testing of alarms) were performed.
Pressure and identity testing was performed easily and rapidly and all outlets were finally shown to conform to specifications. However, during these tests, an odour was detected in the issuing gases.
Contamination of the Gas System
Purity tests were performed on fourteen outlets mounted on six separate panels and a foul smelling aqueous residue of between 0.1 and 0.8 ml (mean 0.5 ml) per 300 I gas was collected. The UV spectrum of the residue showed characteristic benzenoid absorption bands. Using an extinction coefficient of 10,000 (benzenoid absorption), the optical density of the bands in the various samples (Table 2) indicated ~hat the contaminant was present in amounts varying between 20 nmol to 430 nmol per specimen (mean 117 nmol), which corresponds to a mean concentration of approximately 0.4 nmol of pollutant per litre of gas. Although present in minute amounts at the time of testing, the pollutants were easily detected by smell.
The major contaminant in the gas lines was identified as arising from a commercial degreasing solvent which had been used to degrease isolating valves. A comparison of the UV spectra of the degreasing solvent and gas effluent from the ICU was made. This showed that peaks arising from the .degreasing solvent and the gas effluent were at identical wavelengths but occurred in different ratios (Table  2 ). This suggested that fractionation of the contaminant was taking place in the lines. Further confirmation of these findings was made by gas chromatography which compared the retention times (RT) of the fractions of the degreasing solvent (OS) with the gas effluent from four separate sites (Table 3) . ....l :::
.., <:
..:! ... Pure degreasing solvent gave a characteristic gas chromatogram with major peaks occurring at retention times of 2. 3, 6.5, 8, 9.5, 14, 17 and 23 minutes. Ignoring solvent peaks (RT less than one minute) all collected samples had GC peaks which coincided with those of the commercial solvent. It was possible to identify the source of contamination as originating from isolation valves in the gas system. This necessitated replacing the contaminated isolation valves and purging the entire system at high flows with air until the contaminant was no longer detectable. At this stage of the contract, isolation valves with rubber seals were in use and it is likely that this increased the risk of retention of high boiling point substances.
Apparatus
At the time of operational testing, all mechanical and electrical defects had been corrected. Minor defects had been repaired by the FMC staff whilst major problems were referred to vhe supplier. All anaesthetic machines were found to be free from faults.
DISCUSSION
Pipeline Grid Cross-Connections
The fourteen cross-connection errors detected were nearly all potentially lethal but fortunately were corrected prior to clinical usage, unlike cases reported elsewhere (Feeley and Hedley-White 1976, Time Magazine 1977) .
Previous reports of problems of crossconnections can be categorised according to site, viz. 1~1_121~ 7. Gas hoses and their connections.
Obviously the closer to the supply that the error occurs, the larger the number of hazardous outlets. Also the closer the error to the supply, the more likely it will be detected.
However, examples exist (Feeley and Hedley-Whyte 1976, Time Magazine 1977) where errors almost certainly occurred III the secondary main pipe (s) . In the present report, the three defects detected after alterations were made in one room indicates the necessity for a testing programme after any maintenance or alterations are made to an existing pipeline system. This is supported by a previous report of a fatality after faulty maintenance work (Mazze 1972) .
Contamination of Piped Gas System
The initial detection of contamination led us to consider the following possible sources-1. Use of non-degreased pipes. 2. Use of non-degreased fittings, (e.g. isolating valves, formed elbows). 3. Inadequate removal of degreasing agent from cleaned pipes. 4. Inadequate removal of degreasing agent from cleaned fittings. 5. Welding fluxes. 6. Accidental (or deliberate) spoilage. Welding fluxes were quickly excluded as the contaminant, as was inadequate removal of degreasing agent from cleaned pipes, by comparison with UV spectra of contaminant. Medical gas pipes were degreased by an aliphatic hydrocarbon mixture then wiped clean, dried by air and sealed with plastic caps. The manufacturers, however, would not give a written guarantee of quality control. Ordinary (i.e. not degreased) copper tubing did not have the characteristic odour of the contaminant. A comparison of UV spectra of the solvent extracts of non-degreased valve components with degreased components showed different absorption characteristics both unlike those of the contaminant.
The fittings were degreased on the site using a commercial preparation. This did not have the same odour as the contaminant. However, the formula was obtained and this showed it to be a mixture of low boiling point chlorinated alphatic hydrocarbons and 60% refined white spirit containing 15 % aromatic hydrocarbons. After a specimen of this was allowed to evaporate in sunlight, the residue had a similar odour to the residue from the condensed gas effluent. In lieu of qualitative analyses, a comparison of the chemical properties of the residues was made with those of the degreasing agent. These were found to be identical. It was concluded that some fittings were inadequately dried after degreasing.
The pollutant and its source were identified just prior to the opening of the hospital. The solution to this problem was to replace the contaminated isolating valves and to purge the systems with high flows of medical air. It was decided that the opening should not be delayed and that purging would continue in empty wards whilst bottled gases were used in occupied areas with subsequent purging of the latter when the former were cleared for safe use. After reconnection to original supplies and purging with specific gases, identity tests were repeated and found to be in order.
The contamination described above would not have occurred had the recommendations of Section 7.6 of AS 1169 been followed. These recommendations stipulate that degreasing be by washing in a suitable solvent and that the solvent be removed by air. Although not compulsory, a recommended solvent is a hot solution of sodium carbonate or trisodium phosphate. This report indicates the wisdom of using such a solvent in all cases either as a sole solvent or following the preliminary use of a low boiling point organic solvent similar to that employed commercially for degreasing medical copper piping.
Subsequent to these findings Eichhorll et al. (1977) reported a similar example of major contamination of the piped medical gas system by an aromatic hydrocarbon. These authors found the contaminants caused nausea and headache and were a fire hazard.
In May and December, 1977 further buildings were completed at FMC and the above testing procedures repeated but mass spectrometry was added for impurity detection. These methods would also have detected contamination of the bulk nitrous oxide system by higher oxides of nitrogen which are known to be toxic (Clutton-Brock 1967) .
In contrast to previous findings, no defects were found but two groups of exposable pipes required labelling. On this occasion high boiling point degreasing agents were avoided and isolation valves were degreased with warm sodium carbonate solution. In addition isolation valves consisted of all metal screw-type components.
Apparatus
Although all apparatus was found to operate safely, this would have been negated by the delivery of incorrect gases through either the pipeline or cylinders. For example, connecting hoses from wall outlets to the machine may have incorrect connection (handwheel) at one end or may not have an indexed fitting.
The most dangerous hoses are those designed to slide directly into metal tubes. Our current anaesthetic machine (Medishield TM41) incorporates this fault in that the supply hose to the circle circuit may be interchanged with the nearby suction tubing. The Boyle Mark 4 soda lime cannister was originally fitted to take a much larger supply hose but adaptors to accept the smaller (i.e. suction sized) hoses are fitted.
In FMC attempts to minimise this interchange have been by-1. Colour coding the gas supply hose to the circuit. 2. Clamping the gas-supply hose to the fitting on the circle circuit. A common Iow pressure alarm is the "Bosun" device. However, this will not alert for hypoxia due to a crossed oxygen/nitrous oxide line nor due to air being delivered via an oxygen line. An oxygen analyser used continuously "in line" at the patient delivery is the best method of ensuring correct gas mixtures (Mazze 1972) .
CONCLUSIONS
Testing according to SAA 1169-1973 would have detected the fourteen cross-connection defects in the present report but would not necessarily have detected contamination of the piped gas system. This experience indicates that more stringent regulations than those recommended by the SAA are required. It further indicates that hospital authorities should insist upon a testing procedure similar to the one outlined in this report. However, these measures will assist only in obtaining safe operation in the initial period of use. Hazards have been reported during subsequent use, for example patients have received hypoxic gas mixtures because incorrect gases were placed in the bulk oxygen supply tank or incorrect connections were placed on gas hoses. For theSE reasons oxygen analysers with high and low level alarms have been permanently installed on all anaest:hetic machines at FMC and are used "in line" continuously during anaesthesia.
